February 29, 2012
by Mark Tushingham
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The New Zealand Supreme Court Blog is looking for students and practitioners to join its team of contributors
If you’re a practitioner or a law student in Part III or above and you’d like to write on current legal issues for New Zealand’s only blog dedicated to the Supreme Court, then read on!
February 14, 2012
by Jack Oliver-Hood
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What is past is prologue. Twenty-three years ago, a government was forced to address the conflict between recognition of Treaty of Waitangi interests and neoliberal reform.[1] In the face of Māori unease over the risks of irreversible privatisation, that government, sick of playing Prospero, entered into an uneasy but workable compromise. That compromise gave binding powers to an ascendant but delicate Tribunal, a body forced to be uniquely attuned to the political and economic workability of its recommendations. The cost of that pragmatism was weighed by the Supreme Court in Haronga v Waitangi Tribunal (Haronga).[2] The government has changed from red to blue; the assets have changed from forests to power; but the questions for tangata whenua are the same: how can what has been lost be regained? And will the same problem be posed in another twenty-three years’ time?
February 7, 2012
by Nick Dobbs
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Abdula v R concerned the right of accused persons, who do not adequately speak or understand English, to hear and understand the case against them at trial via an interpreter. The right to the free assistance of an interpreter is provided for by section 24(g) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, though this is one of the few occasions when the content of that right has been considered.
The Supreme Court held that despite the occasional difficulties which may have arisen with interpreting the appellant (during his criminal trial on charges of sexual violation) he was unable to show that the interpreting did not meet the standard required by the Bill of Rights Act. Mr Abdula’s right to a fair trial under s 24(g) had therefore not been breached.
December 5, 2011
by Benedict Tompkins & Rachel McMaster
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The Supreme Court released their judgment in Vodafone v Telecom on 17 November. While the case began as four appeals, post-hearing settlement condensed it to one. At issue in this appeal was whether the Commerce Commission (the “Commission”) erred in law in assessing costs for the purposes of the Telecommunications Act 2001 on the basis of Telecom’s existing network rather than on the basis of a network using mobile technology. Due to legislative change, the specific facts of this decision are not of precedental value. This case is potentially notable, however, for the comments of the Court in relation to the doctrine of error of law.
November 7, 2011
by Sir Edmund (Ted) Thomas
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I am impressed by the critical comments of Jeff Simpson on this blog relating to the judgment of the Chief Justice in Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101. Jeff Simpson’s knowledge of the case law far exceeds my own, and I am not in a position to expand on his discourse on the third source, save to say that I have always thought that something of the sort is necessary to authorize a governmental agency to do such things as undertake negotiations, enter into contracts and, indeed, purchase paper clips for the office. But, as Jeff acknowledges, it is a residual freedom subordinate to statutory law, the common law and the royal prerogative. I am, however, hesitant about extending it to cover what might be called the coercive powers of the state which interfere with the basic rights of citizens.
October 17, 2011
by James McGeorge
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In Specialized Bicycle Components v Sheppard and Avanti [2011] NZSC 123 the Supreme Court granted leave on the question whether the terms of a mediation and confidentiality agreement preclude a party from adducing evidence to show that they reached an oral settlement agreement.
October 16, 2011
by Jeff Simpson
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Judicial decisions handed down under intense media scrutiny rarely result in good law. The recent Supreme Court Decision in R v Hamed [2011] NZSC 101 is an example. A summary of this decision has already been posted on this blog. This post assesses the accuracy of comments made by Elias CJ in Hamed regarding the scope of the government’s ability to act. The Chief Justice’s views are found antithetical to recent judicial acceptance in the United Kingdom of the government having a residual freedom to undertake any action that is not prohibited, even if it is not specifically authorised to do so.
October 12, 2011
by Rebekah Thompson
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Harney v Police [2011] NZSC 107 is the first time that the Supreme Court has dealt with section 45 of the Evidence Act 2006, which controls the admissibility of identification evidence. The decision sees the Court imposing a higher threshold on what constitutes a “good reason” for not following a formal identification procedure under s 45. Such an approach is a sensible one to take, given the dangers that s 45 seeks to avoid.
October 12, 2011
by James McGeorge
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In Weatherston v R [2011] NZSC 105 the Supreme Court denied Clayton Weatherston leave to appeal. The decision centered on whether an interview in the media prejducied his right to a fair trial and whether the prosecution should have obtained leave under s 38(2)(b) of the Evidence Act 2006 before cross-examining Weatherston’s veracity. The decision exhausts Weatherston’s appeals and concludes the widely publicised saga that had prompted the abolition of the provocation defence in New Zealand’s criminal law.
September 26, 2011
by Olga Ostrovsky
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Last week the Supreme Court gave judgment in R v Hamed [2011] NZSC 101. The case centres on the controversial police raids on a group of Maori activists in the Urewera ranges back in November 2006. The Court’s most significant finding was that illegal covert surveillance was undertaken by police over a period of 18 months. In light of the ruling, the Crown dropped charges against 13 of the appellants for lack of admissible evidence with which to proceed. Some of the illegally obtained evidence was nevertheless admitted under s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006 leading to fresh charges being laid against the four remaining appellants.